~$770B combined 2026 capex
various (vintaged)
Hyperscaler capex →Forecasts
Which claims are surviving contact with reality? Follow upcoming tests first, then compare later evidence, shared milestones, and changes in published expectations.
These are the nearest comparable deadlines still in play. They are checkpoints to revisit—not probabilities that an event will happen.
various (vintaged)
Hyperscaler capex →AI 2027
Largest known single training run →various (vintaged)
Frontier training compute →AI 2027
Global AI compute stock →Situational Awareness
Algorithmic efficiency (pretraining) →Situational Awareness
Frontier training compute →This is a coverage-limited status map, not an evaluation of whole bodies of work. Selection is not preregistered or representative; forecasts, scenarios, models, and intentions answer different questions, so counts are never grades.
| Body of work | Coverage | Current evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Situational Awareness Leopold Aschenbrenner · 2024-06 | 5 comparable · 6 proxy/context 7 areas: capability, compute, algorithms, physical, capital, value, response |
1 confirmed1 ahead1 on-track2 pending
Jump to individual claims
|
| AI 2027 Kokotajlo/Lifland et al. · 2025-04 | 3 comparable · 4 proxy/context 4 areas: compute, automation, physical, value |
1 on-track1 behind1 indeterminate
Jump to individual claims
|
| Dec 2025 timelines update AI Futures Project · 2025-12 | 1 comparable · 0 proxy/context 1 area: automation |
1 pending
Jump to individual claims |
| Forethought SIE series MacAskill/Davidson et al. · 2025 | 2 comparable · 0 proxy/context 2 areas: capability, algorithms |
2 on-track
|
| Bio Anchors (2-yr update)Ajeya Cotra · 2022 | Source registeredNo structured claim harvest yet | Not scored. An empty row describes tracker coverage, not the forecaster’s position. |
| various (vintaged) Epoch AI · varies | 4 comparable · 3 proxy/context 4 areas: compute, physical, capital, value |
3 on-track1 pending
Jump to individual claims
|
| Compute-centric takeoff-speeds framework Tom Davidson · 2023 | 0 comparable · 3 proxy/context 3 areas: compute, algorithms, automation | |
| Case for multi-decade timelinesEge Erdil · 2025-04 | Source registeredNo structured claim harvest yet | Not scored. An empty row describes tracker coverage, not the forecaster’s position. |
| AI Infrastructure Spending: Inelastic Demand and Rising Costs Morgan Stanley · 2026 | 0 comparable · 1 proxy/context 1 area: capital |
Jump to individual claims |
| Internal-goals statement (livestream + X post) Sam Altman (OpenAI) · 2025-10 | 0 comparable · 1 proxy/context 1 area: automation |
Jump to individual claims |
Coverage varies by source and subject. Portfolio bars include only selected direct and formula-backed translated claims; proxy and context claims remain linked but excluded. Status and assessment confidence remain separate.
Authors use different definitions and dates. This ladder keeps their original wording, then shows where their claims overlap.
No structured forecast is attached to this rung yet.
“the new model with median parameters predicts SC in Dec 2031”AI Futures Model Dec 2025 update (supersedes AI 2027's Mar 2027 scenario date; do NOT overwrite the original — record both)
Conditionality: firm model output, but authors retain 'highly uncertain... cannot confidently predict a specific year'
Revision trail: ai2027-apr2025 SC date (2027-03)
Evidence · 2026-07Nothing close to the SC bar (any AGI-company coding task, 30x faster, 30x cheaper) exists: SWE-bench Verified 79.2% (Opus 4.6), Terminal-Bench 2.0 ~65%; the independent AI 2027 tracker grades SC 'Not Yet Testable' (Jun 2026). The authors' aggregate self-grading puts quantitative progress at ~65-75% of scenario pace.Canonical measurement source 1 ↗
CounterargumentEven the revised median has wide CI (10th pct 2027.5), and individual forecaster medians (Daniel ~2029, Eli ~2032) still disagree by years — the Dec 2031 model output is not a settled team view.
“it is strikingly plausible that by 2027, models will be able to do the work of an AI researcher/engineer.”Ch I, From GPT-4 to AGI
Conditionality: conditional-scenario ('strikingly plausible')
Evidence · 2026-07Strong coding-agent adoption and longer autonomy, but no autonomous AI-researcher demonstrated; RE-Bench-class evals still short of expert autonomy.Canonical measurement source 1 ↗
CounterargumentThe AI Futures Project itself (Dec 2025) pushed its Superhuman Coder median from Jan 2027 to Dec 2031, evidence against the 2027 rung.
“We have set internal goals of having an automated AI research intern by September of 2026 running on hundreds of thousands of GPUs, and a true automated AI researcher by March of 2028.”Livestream + X post, 2025-10-28 (x.com/sama/status/1983584366547829073)
Conditionality: explicit self-hedge in the same statement: 'We may totally fail at this goal.' Lab-leader statement = intention data (bottom of the evidence hierarchy), scored with the corresponding discount.
Evidence · 2026-07Six weeks from the intern deadline, no public demonstration exists. Strongest adjacent result is DeepMind's AlphaEvolve (novel matrix-multiplication algorithm — real but narrow-domain optimization, not open-ended research). METR's NanoGPT-speedrun analysis (Apr 2026): AI contributions real but 'none reached the deep or breakthrough end of the scale'.Canonical measurement source 1 ↗
CounterargumentAn 'internal goal' can be declared met internally without public verification — this claim may resolve only on OpenAI's say-so, which the evidence hierarchy discounts to intention data either way.
“Early 2026: AI R&D progress multiplier reaches 1.5x — algorithmic progress '50% faster' with AI assistants than without”AI 2027 scenario narrative + compute-forecast multiplier table. CANONICAL READING: the narrative ladder (1.5x early 2026 -> 3x Jan 2027) — the corpus has two conflicting multiplier tables (compute-forecast quarterly vs takeoff-forecast milestone-tied), recorded per schema rule 4.
Conditionality: scenario narrative with the project-wide hedge ('not a prediction; 2027 was our modal year'). The authors' own end-2026 target was 1.9x, which they now grade 'behind pace'.
Evidence · 2026-07METR's self-report survey (May 2026) median value-multiplier is 1.4-2x; METR's production-function read of Anthropic's 8x code-volume figure puts researcher uplift 'plausibly >2x'; the third-party AI 2027 tracker marks the 1.5x rung On Track. Evidence is self-report-dominated, hence the discount.Canonical measurement source 1 ↗
CounterargumentAnthropic's own system card says acceleration is 'well short of a sustained, AI-attributable doubling of the overall pace'; the only RCT-grade measurement found a 19% SLOWDOWN (since methodologically disowned by METR itself, but never replaced with a positive result); self-reports historically overstate measured savings by ~40 percentage points.
No structured forecast is attached to this rung yet.
Each line follows one person’s published median over time. It shows revision, not consensus: these estimates are never averaged together.
| Forecaster | Published | Median year | Milestone |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cotra — transformative AI | 2020-09 | 2050 | Not recorded |
| Cotra — transformative AI | 2022-08 | 2040 | Not recorded |
| Kokotajlo — AGI | 2025-04 | 2028 | Not recorded |
| Kokotajlo — AGI | 2026-01 | 2030.95 | Not recorded |
| Lifland — AGI | 2025-04 | 2031 | Not recorded |
| Lifland — AGI | 2025-12 | 2035 | Not recorded |